Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.: A Reminder of the Broad Scope of § 230 Immunity by Rifkind, Alex S.
Golden Gate University Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 6 
March 2021 
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.: A Reminder of the Broad 
Scope of § 230 Immunity 
Alex S. Rifkind 
Golden Gate University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alex S. Rifkind, Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.: A Reminder of the Broad Scope of § 230 Immunity, 
51 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 49 (2021). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized editor of GGU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu. 
NOTE
DYROFF V. ULTIMATE SOFTWARE
GROUP, INC.: A REMINDER OF THE
BROAD SCOPE OF § 230 IMMUNITY
ALEX S. RIFKIND*
“Nothing vast enters into the life of mortals without a curse.”1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet2 is one of the most ubiquitous and accessible methods
of modern communication.3 Today, Internet users access, create, and edit
online content.4 Like newspapers, Internet content consists of a combina-
tion of information and speech. However, unlike other forms of commu-
nication, such as broadcast media,5 the Internet receives greater speech
* J.D./LL.M Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2021; B.S.
Neuropharmacology, University of California at Santa Barbara, May 2012, M.S. Biological
Sciences, Dominican University of California, May 2016. Associate Editor, 2020-21, Golden Gate
University Law Review.
1 Sophocles, ANTIGONE (442 B.C.E).
2 The capitalized form Internet is more commonly used in U.S. publications. The Internet is
defined as “an electronic communications network that connects computer networks and organiza-
tional computer facilities around the world.” (Internet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Internet (last visited Oct. 19, 2020)).
3 Emily Elert, How the Internet Has Spread Around the World, POPSCI (Dec. 11, 2012)
https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-12/widening-world-web-internet-infographic/.
4 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48, n.7 (1998) (“[T]he users of Internet information
are also its producers”).
5 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (“[S]pecial justifications for
regulation of . . . broadcast media . . . are not applicable to other speakers”).
49
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protection under the First Amendment.6 Content regulation and speech
moderation on the Internet remains controversial.7
Historically, Congress’s regulation of the Internet proved unsuccess-
ful.  In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”),8 which banned obscene material accessible to minors over any
telecommunications device, including the Internet.9 In 1997, in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Supreme Court held
many of the CDA’s provisions as a vague10 and overbroad11 form of
content-based12 speech suppression in violation of the First Amend-
ment.13 Congress responded by enacting the Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”),14 a narrower regulation that punishes indecent material dis-
played online with a commercial purpose.15 Similarly, in Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court protected speech on
the Internet by affirming a preliminary injunction against COPA enforce-
ment, finding less restrictive and potentially more efficient alternative
methods of regulation.16 Together, Reno and Ashcroft demonstrate the
judiciary’s reservation to impose content-based restrictions on Internet
6 See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”); see generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (Because Congress has a significant “interest in
fostering the growth of the Internet[,] . . . [t]he interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a
democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship”).
7 See David L. Hudson Jr., Free speech or censorship? Social media litigation is a hot legal
battleground, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/social-clashes-
digital-free-speech.
8 47 U.S.C § 223.
9 47 U.S.C § 223(a)(1), (d)(1).
10 “A law is unconstitutionally vague [under the First Amendment] if it fails to provide a
reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited or is so indefinite as to allow arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” Tuscan Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir.
2004). However, “perfect clarity is not required even when a law regulates protected speech.” Cal.
Teacher’s Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).
11 “A law is overbroad under the First Amendment if it ‘reaches a substantial number of
impermissible applications’ relative to the law’s legitimate sweep.” Shickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858
(6th Cir. 2019) (quoting East Brooks Books, Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 588 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2009)).
12 “A content-based regulation is one that is ‘based upon either the content or the subject
matter of the speech.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New
York, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (citing Ward v. Rick Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989));
see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“A law that is content based on its
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justifi-
cation, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech”) (citing Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
13 Reno, 521 U.S. at 875-76.
14 47 U.S.C § 231.
15 47 U.S.C § 231(a).
16 See Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 564 (2002) (“[F]ilters are less
restrictive means than COPA . . . [as] [t]hey impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving
2
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speech. However, both cases concerned indecent expression, a constitu-
tionally protected form of speech under the First Amendment.17 Compar-
atively, publication of defamation or illegal content falls outside freedom
of speech protection under the First Amendment.18
While historically within the purview of newspapers, the transition
to publication of content online opened the door for an interactive com-
puter service (“ICS”)19 to face similar intermediary liability for posting
illegal or defamatory content.20 The result of imposing intermediary lia-
bility on ICSs created a chilling effect on Internet speech and disincen-
tivized ICS self-regulation of content provided by third parties.21
Congress responded by enacting § 230 of the CDA, intending to incen-
tivize ICSs to engage in their own process of regulation and screening.22
In return, § 230 provides broad intermediary liability protection to
ICSs so that they may engage in content moderation without fear of ex-
posure to liability for offensive or illegal material that slips through.23 As
a result, § 230 provides a significant safeguard to Internet innovation and
development.24 However, varied judicial interpretation of the circum-
stances required to invoke § 230 immunity has led to inconsistent re-
end, not universal restrictions at the source . . . [and] filtering software may well be more effective
than COPA . . .”).
17 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 604 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“COPA seeks to limit protected
speech”).
18 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964) (defamation is
generally understood as a false statement of fact concerning a person that causes some form of harm
to the person and his/her reputation); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008)
(“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protec-
tion”) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973)); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
19 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet . . . ”).
20 See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (ICS held accountable for defamatory content posted on its website by anonymous third-party),
superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230; Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (defendant ICS not liable because it did not know, or have reason to know, of
defamatory content on its website); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *5-6 (defendant ICS
treated as a publisher when it created an editorial staff to monitor and edit website).
21 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
22 Id. at 331.
23 See Id. at 330 (“[Section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider
liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred”).
24 CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, Electronic Frontier Found.,
http://www.eff.org/issues/cda230; accord Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regula-
tion, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2296, 2313 (2014).
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sults.25 Lack of a clear standard places application of § 230 immunity on
a sliding scale between the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.26  of unconditional
immunity27 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee For Civil Rights Under
the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.28 of conditional immunity.29 Historically,
the Ninth Circuit followed the holding from Zeran and utilized its ratio-
nale as foundation for its own test to determine if § 230 immunity ap-
plies—the Barnes Test.30
The Ninth Circuit applied the Barnes Test to a § 230 immunity chal-
lenge in the recent case of Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group.31 The
plaintiff, Kristanalea Dyroff, sued Ultimate Software Group (“Ultimate
Software”) for its alleged role in the tragic death of her son, Wesley
Greer.32 The Ninth Circuit found § 230 immunized Ultimate Software’s
from liability and barred Dyroff’s claims.33
Although advocates of § 230 praised the decision in Dyroff for up-
holding ICS immunity,34 the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of automated
manipulations of third-party content as content-neutral tools will likely
broaden the application § 230 immunity in future decisions.35 The Dyroff
decision comes despite concern from the media and Congress that § 230
25 See Jerry Kang, Communications Law & Policy, 331, 335-38, 351-54 (4th ed. 2012) (not-
ing a lack of unity among federal courts regarding § 230’s scope of enforcement).
26 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
27 Id. at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service”).
28 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666 (7th Cir. 2008).
29 Id. at 669-70.
30 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (immunity from liability
existing for “(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to
treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by
another information content provider”).
31 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020).
32 Id. at 1094.
33 Id. at 1101.
34 See Eric Goldman, A Significant Section 230 Defense Win in the Ninth Circuit-Dyroff v.
Ultimate Software. TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 21, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2019/08/a-significant-section-230-defense-win-in-the-ninth-circuit-dyroff-v-ultimate-
software.htm.
35 See Jeffrey Neuburger, Ninth Circuit Releases Another Important CDA Section 230 Opin-
ion With Broad Application – Automated Content Recommendation and Notification Tools Do Not




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/6
2021] Note 53
might need revision.36  However, the focus should not necessarily con-
cern revision and amendment, but instead reinforce the original intent of
the statute and encourage greater ICS accountability in moderating ille-
gal and unlawful content.37
Part I of this Note examines the factual and procedural history of
Dyroff and discusses the Ninth Circuit’s application of § 230 immunity
in the case.  Part II outlines the history of the CDA and examines how
the federal courts have interpreted § 230 immunity leading up to its ap-
plication in Dyroff.  Part III discusses judicial interpretation of the scope
of § 230 immunity. Lastly, Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly
applied the law in the Dyroff decision, but failed to adequately define the
term content-neutral. Further, by not defining what falls within the scope
of content-neutral, the Ninth Circuit’s holding implicitly immunizes any
manipulation of third-party content facilitating communication that does
not materially contribute to the content at issue. The broad shield of
§ 230 immunity, which was necessary for growth and development dur-
ing the Internet’s infancy, is antiquated and should be narrowed by Con-
gress to foster greater accountability to prevent tragedies like Dyroff
from recurring.
I. DYROFF V. ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP, INC.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2007, Ultimate Software launched a social networking site called
the Experience Project.38 The website consisted of numerous and distinct
online communities that were formed by members based on common
interests, attributes, or experiences.39 Users interacted anonymously with
each other by posting and answering questions.40 Experience Project did
36 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shield for Websites Rattles Under Onslaught of Hate
Speech. THE NEW YORK TIMES. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/technology/
section-230-hate-speech.html; see, e.g., Eric Goldman, How SESTA Undermines Section 230’s
Good Samaritan Provisions, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 7, 2017), http://blog.ericgold
man.org/archives/2017/11/howsesta-undermines-section-230s-good-samaritan-provisions.htm (ad-
dressing congressional efforts to amend § 230).
37 See, e.g., Joshua Geltzer, President and Congress Are Thinking of Changing This Impor-
tant Internet Law, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/cda-section-230-
trump-congress.html (“Sen. Ron Wyden, a co-author of Section 230, has explained that it was in-
tended as both a ‘shield’ and a ‘sword’ for tech companies, protecting them from liability for vast
amounts of content for which they’re not assuming responsibility but also empowering them to do
what they can to eliminate the worst of that content”).
38 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1095.
39 Id. at 1094-95 (group topics ranging from “I like dogs,” “I have lung cancer,” “I’m going
to Stanford,” to “I Love Heroin”).
40 Id. at 1094.
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not limit or encourage the type of interactions members engaged in on
the site.41 Experience Project utilized advanced machine-learning algo-
rithms to analyze user data and glean the underlying intent and emotional
state of its users.42 Ultimate Software then sold this information for com-
mercial purposes (directed advertisements) and to steer users to particu-
lar groups through its notification and recommendation functions.43 The
recommendation functionality also included an email suite and other
push notifications, which alerted users of new content posted to its
groups.44 Experience Project generated revenue through directed adver-
tisements and the sale of tokens that users were required to purchase to
post questions to other users in its groups.45
In August 2015, Wesley Greer, a recovering heroin addict, con-
ducted a Google search to purchase heroin and was directed to Experi-
ence Project.46 Greer created an account and purchased tokens that
enabled him to post questions to other users.47 He posted to a group titled
“where can i score heroin in jacksonville, fl.” (sic).48 On August 17,
2015, Experience Project sent Greer an email notifying him that another
user posted a response to the “where can i score heroin in jacksonville,
fl.” (sic) group and provided a hyperlink and URL directing his re-
sponse.49 The response came from Hugo Margenat-Castro, an Orlando-
based drug dealer, who regularly used Experience Project to sell her-
oin.50 Greer obtained Castro’s phone number through Experience Pro-
ject, and later bought heroin from Castro.51 On August 19, 2015, Greer
died from fentanyl toxicity, unaware of its presence in the heroin that he
purchased from Castro.52 Castro was later arrested and prosecuted; in
March 2017, he plead guilty to selling fentanyl-laced heroin through Ex-
perience Project.53
In March 2016, Experience Project publicly announced it was shut-
ting down in response to privacy concerns, which stemmed from govern-
mental overreach and insufficient resources to respond to government
41 Id.
42 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1095.
46 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2017), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019).
47 Id.
48 Id.




53 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1095.
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information requests.54 While Experience Project was active, users
shared 67 million experiences, made 15 million connections, and asked 5
million questions.55
Kristanalea Dyroff, Greer’s mother, brought suit against Ultimate
Software asserting seven state claims that predicated liability on Experi-
ence Project’s use of data mining and machine-learning of its users’
posts to recommend and to steer Greer toward heroin-related discussion
groups and the drug dealer, who ultimately sold him fentanyl-laced her-
oin.56 The district court dismissed all claims, holding Ultimate Software
immune under § 230(c)(1) because its recommendation algorithms con-
stituted content-neutral tools that facilitated communication, but did not
create or develop the content at issue.57 The district court also found that
Experience Project neither had a special relationship with Greer nor cre-
ated risk through its website functionalities, and therefore owed no duty
of care to Greer about another user’s illegal activities.58 Subsequently, in
June 2018, Dyroff appealed to the Ninth Circuit.59
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS ULTIMATE SOFTWARE NOT LIABLE
UNDER § 230
On appeal, Dyroff alleged the district court erred in holding § 230 of
the CDA immunized Ultimate Software, that the allegations of collusion
between Ultimate Software and drug dealers using Experience Project
were not plausible, and that Ultimate Software owed no duty of care.60
However, on August 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling in a published opinion, finding that § 230 barred Dyroff’s
claims against Ultimate Software.61
Under the Ninth Circuit’s Barnes Test “[i]mmunity from liability
exists for ‘(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
[(“ICS”)] (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of
action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2017), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) (Dyroff claiming (1) Negligence, (2)
Wrongful Death, (3) Premises Liability, (4) Failure to Warn, (5) Civil Conspiracy, (6) Unjust En-
richment, and (7) a violation of the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11700,
et seq.) and asserting that Ultimate Software had knowledge or should have had knowledge of illegal
drug transaction occurring on its website).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 2761 (2020).
60 Id. at 1096.
61 Id.
7
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information content provider [(“ICP”)].’”62 In Dyroff, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the term ICS expansively63 and determined that Ultimate
Software was an ICS for the following reasons: its structure was a web-
site;64 it did not create or publish its own content; and it did not become
an ICP65 through the use of content-neutral website functions. Collec-
tively, these findings satisfied Barnes’s first prong.66
The court found Barnes’s second prong satisfied because Ultimate
Software did not create or develop information or content that led to
Greer’s death, since the posts to the group were made by Greer and Cas-
tro.67 Although Dyroff argued that Experience Project’s recommendation
algorithms and push notification system constituted creation of content,
the court disagreed and reasoned that the website features were “tools
meant to facilitate the communication and content of others,” but were
not actually content.68
The court held Barnes’s third prong satisfied because Ultimate
Software had not materially contributed to the content posted on Experi-
ence Project leading to Greer’s death. The court drew inference from
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,69 and
identified the following as material contributions arising to the creation
of content:  mandating posting criteria, suggesting posting content, or
clearly making a direct contribution to unlawful and offensive user posts
to the content.70  The court found Experience Project’s website functions
facilitated user-to-user communication and content, but did not materi-
ally contribute to the content itself.71
62 Id. at 1097 (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 2009)).
63 See Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016).
64 See Id. at 1268 (acknowledging that websites are the most common interactive computer
service); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir 2008) (en banc) (“[t]oday, the most common interactive computer services are
websites”).
65 An “ICP” is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive com-
puter service.” 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3).
66 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1097
67 Id. at 1098-99.
68 Id. at 1098; See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1098 (“[P]roliferation and dissemination of content
does not equal creation or development of content”).
69 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
70 Id. at 1098-99; See also Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269 (Material contribution falls into two
categorially distinct actions, those traditional to publishers and those that make displayed content
illegal).
71 Id. at 1099 (“[T]he material contribution test makes a ‘“crucial distinction between, on the
one hand, taking actions (traditional to publishers) that are necessary to the display of unwelcome
and actionable content and, on the other hand, responsibility for what makes the displayed content
illegal or actionable’”) (quoting Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269, n.4).
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In addition, the court also considered Dyroff’s attempts to circum-
vent § 230 immunity, which alleged Ultimate Software had actual or
constructive knowledge of illegal activity occurring on its website, and
owed a duty of care to Greer. Dyroff contended that Ultimate Software
knew or should have known of illegal drug transactions occurring be-
tween its users, and facilitated transactions through its anonymity fea-
tures.72 The court found Dyroff’s reliance upon J.S. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings, L.L.C.73 unpersuasive because Ultimate Software’s an-
onymity practices, public statements of concern for internet privacy, and
the burden of law enforcement information requests were not facts that
plausibly suggest collusion with drug dealers.74 Dyroff’s duty of care
argument was predicated on a failure to warn theory of misfeasance.75
Misfeasance occurs when a defendant worsens a plaintiff’s position and
creates a duty of care where one did not originally exist.76 The court
determined that Ultimate Software did not worsen Greer’s position
through its recommendation algorithms and push notification features be-
cause these website functions were applied to all users.77 Furthermore,
the court held that a website could not function if facilitating communi-
cation in a content-neutral fashion between users created a duty of
care.78
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE CDA AND § 230 IMMUNITY
From a modern perspective, the Internet of the ’90s was an un-
recognizable landscape.79 The new dial-up Internet connected users
through bulletin boards;80 online newspapers were just emerging;81
Google did not hold the linguistic status of a verb; and the intuitiveness
72 Id. at 1099-100.
73 See generally J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 184 Wash. 2d 95 (2015) (en
banc) (holding that minors sufficiently alleged website operators of Backpage.com facilitated sexual
exploitation of children and claims against website were not barred by § 230).
74 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1100.
75 Id. at 1100. (“When analyzing duty of care in the context of third-party acts, California
courts distinguish between ‘misfeasance’ and ‘nonfeasance’”).
76 Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 716 (2001).
77 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101.
78 Id.; See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
no special relationship exists between Facebook and its users).
79 See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, Presenting: This is What the Internet Looked Like in 1996,
BUS. INSIDER AUS. (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-coolest-web-sites-from-
1996-2014-4#-8.
80 See Benj Edwards, The Lost Civilization of Dial-Up Bulletin Board Systems, THE ATLAN-
TIC (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/the-lost-civilization-of-
dial-up-bulletin-board-systems/506465/.
81 See Peter H. Lewis, The New York Times Introduces a Website, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 1996)
at D7.
9
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of modern online research capabilities was nonexistent.82 Within this
burgeoning technological environment, Congress could not have fore-
seen how the modern Internet would develop two decades into the
twenty-first century.
Congress did address one development of the Internet of the ‘90s:
online pornography.83 The CDA, attached to Title V of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996,84 was intended to safeguard children from expo-
sure to indecent online material by criminalizing the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent material to minors and incentivizing
telecommunication companies to participate in blocking the explicit ma-
terial.85 However, the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU struck many of
the vague and controversial criminal provisions of the CDA as an over-
broad form of content-based speech suppression, in violation of the First
Amendment.86 Reno and its progeny would later pressure Congress to
revisit the CDA to ensure protection of the Internet, and ultimately pro-
vide the rationale for the addition of § 230.
A. THE RISE OF § 230 IMMUNITY
In the years preceding § 230’s enactment, two Internet liability
cases, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.87 and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co.,88 encouraged Congress to define the boundaries of
ICS liability. The Cubby court held CompuServe, a predecessor to the
modern ICS, was subject to the same standard of liability applied to
82 See Megan Sapnar Ankerson, How Coolness Defined the World Wide Web of the 1990s,
THE ATLANTIC (July 15, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/how-cool-
ness-defined-the-world-wide-web-of-the-1990s/374443/.
83 See 141 CONG. REC. §1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement Sen. Exon, author of the
CDA, arguing for his version of the CDA, denouncing pornography on the Internet, and expressing
concern that the Internet would become a red-light district).
84 Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-09, 551-52, 561, 110 Stat. 56, 133-37, 139-43 (1996) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
85 See S. REP. No. 104-23, at 59 (1995); see 141 CONG. REC. 15,503 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Exon, author of the CDA) (“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is
to provide much needed protection for children”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 860 (1997)
(the incentive to participate in blocking explicit material arising from two affirmative defenses,
“[o]ne cover[ing] those who take ‘good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions’” to
restrict a minor’s access to prohibited communications under § 223(e)(5)(A), the other covering
“those who restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof,
such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code” under § 223(e)(5)(B)).
86 See Reno at 858-60, 874-76 (CDA must pass heightened First Amendment scrutiny be-
cause plaintiffs were information content providers).
87 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
88 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), as recognized in Force
v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 2019).
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traditional news vendors—“whether [CompuServe] knew or had reason
to know of . . . allegedly defamatory [or illegal] statements.”89 Four years
later, the Stratton Oakmont court declined to apply Cubby’s liability
standard and imposed liability on an Internet service provider who edited
third party content.90 Together Cubby and Stratton Oakmont had the ef-
fect of immunizing online service providers from liability when no action
is taken to edit or screen user-generated content and creating liability
when actions were taken to moderate content.91
The decisions in Cubby and Stratton Oakmont generated widespread
publicity and lobbying by tech companies, which led Congress to con-
sider an appropriate legislative remedy.92 The addition of § 230 to the
CDA explicitly addressed the problematic Stratton Oakmont decision.93
With enactment of § 230, Congress abrogated Stratton Oakmont’s hold-
ing and provided broad immunity to ICSs. Congress reasoned that broad
immunity was a more effective means of promoting content moderation
than explicitly requiring ICSs to moderate content.94
B. STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF § 230
Section 230 has two key provisions that address its primary goals—
Internet innovation95 and voluntary content moderation96—codified in
89 Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140-41.
90 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 at *10.
91 See Mary Jane Fine, Mom Wants AOL to Pay in Child’s Sex Ordeal, She Calls Service
Liable, Despite Law, BERGEN REC. (Apr. 19, 1998) at A01.
92 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 2008). Congressman Christopher Cox, who would later become a paid lobbyist for the
tech industry, cosponsored § 230 to protect companies “who take[ ] steps to screen indecency and
offensive material for their customers.” 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Cox).
93 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because
they have restricted access to objectionable material”).
94 141 CONG. REC. H8471-472 (1995) (“[T]here is a tremendous disincentive for online ser-
vice providers to create family friendly services by detecting and removing objectionable content.
These providers face the risk of increased liability where they take reasonable steps to police their
systems . . . [§ 230] removes the liability of providers . . . who make a good faith effort to edit the
smut from their systems. It also encourages the online services industry to develop new technology,
such as blocking software, to empower parents to monitor and control the information their kids can
access”).
95 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (“[T]o promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (“[T]o pre-
serve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other com-
puter services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”).
96 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (“[T]o encourage the development of technologies which maxi-
mize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use
the Internet and other interactive computer services”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (“[T]o remove disin-
11
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§ 230(c)(1) and § 230(c)(2), respectively. Section 230(c)(1) prohibits any
provider of an ICS97 from being treated as the publisher or speaker of
any content provided by an ICP.98 Importantly, an ICS does not lose its
§ 230 immunity if a good faith effort is made to moderate and remove
material that the provider finds objectionable.99 This provision enables
an ICS to set and enforce content standards without becoming subject to
liability for the content provided by an ICP.
Section 230’s broad immunity is limited by several exceptions. First,
an ICS is not immunized when user content violates federal criminal
law.100 Second, there is no immunity for an ICS when its users violate
copyright or other intellectual property laws.101 Third, immunity is inap-
plicable to violations of federal wiretap laws or provisions of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.102
III. INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF § 230
Section 230’s straightforward immunity provisions and clear excep-
tions left room open for judicial interpretation of how immunity should
apply to an ICS when faced with a liability suit. The initial decade of
§ 230 enforcement was marked by sweeping application of immunity.
However, the broad protection afforded at the outset would gradually
erode to reveal § 230’s limits.
centives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material”); 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (“[T]o ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer”).
97 An ICS is defined as “any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered
by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
98 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  An “ICP” is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service” as per 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3).
99 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of- (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitu-
tionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content provid-
ers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)”).
100 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforce-
ment of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual
exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute”).
101 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (providing that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act establishes a notice-and-takedown procedure requiring an ICS to remove
copyright infringing material if it receives notice or face liability from the copyright holder for
failure to remove the material).
102 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4).
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A. § 230 AND EXPANSIVE IMMUNITY
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
issued an opinion in Zeran v. America Online,103 which ushered in an era
of court decisions that broadly interpreted the scope of § 230 immunity.
Zeran concerned an anonymous post on an America Online (“AOL”)
bulletin board alleging a user was selling offensive t-shirts.104 The post
included the user’s home phone number, which resulted angry phone
calls and death threats.105 Subsequently, the user brought a liability suit
against AOL for the anonymous poster’s defamatory speech.106
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the “plain language” of § 230(c)(1)
“creates federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service.”107 Accordingly, any “lawsuits seeking to hold a service pro-
vider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial func-
tions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter
content—are barred.”108 The Zeran opinion was the first instance where
a federal appellate court interpreted the scope of § 230, which resulted in
courts across the nation quickly adopting its broad reading.109
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit applied Zeran’s broad interpretation of
§ 230 immunity and extended it to a website that hosted user-generated
content in Carfarano v. Metrosplash.com.110 The Carafano decision
found Matchmaker.com (“Matchmaker”), an online dating service, im-
mune from liability arising from a user’s fabricated profile that included
photographs of the plaintiff.111 After the plaintiff received sexually ex-
plicit and threatening messages in response to the false profile, plaintiff’s
counsel requested Matchmaker remove the false profile and the company
complied.112 The plaintiff brought suit for “invasion of privacy, misap-
propriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and negligence.”113
The Ninth Circuit found Matchmaker immune under § 230 because
“so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published con-
103 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
104 Id. at 329.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 329-30.
107 Id. at 330.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Congress has made
a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an
active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others”).
110 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
111 Id. at 1121.
112 Id. at 1122.
113 Id.
13
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tent, the interactive service provider [(ISP)] receives full immunity re-
gardless of the specific editing or selection process.”114 The decision
broadened the scope of § 230 immunity, so that its protections applied
even when a website provided the opportunity for third parties to create
illegal content.115
B. THE SHIELD BEGINS TO CRACK: § 230 IMMUNITY LIMITATIONS
The limitless certainty of § 230 immunity did not endure beyond its
infancy. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued the Roommates.com en banc
opinion116 that marked a stark detour from its routine application of
broad § 230 immunity. Roommates.com (“Roommates”) connected indi-
viduals looking for housing with those who had rooms to rent. As a re-
quirement of the rental process, subscribers created a profile using the
website’s automated questionnaire, which requested information con-
cerning sexual orientation, gender, and whether children would be living
in the rental.117 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley and the
City of San Diego brought suit against Roommates, alleging violation of
federal and state housing discrimination laws, which prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, gender and family status.118
The Ninth Circuit found § 230 did not apply to Roommates because
the “CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties to express
illegal preferences.”119 Because Roommates required subscribers to pro-
vide information that violated housing discrimination laws—sexual ori-
entation, gender, and family status—as a condition of accessing its
service and provided “a limited set of pre-populated answers, Room-
mates [became] much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it [became] the developer, at least in part, of that
information.”120  The holding affirms that transition from an ICS to an
ICP proscribes application of § 230 immunity because the provision
114 Id. at 1123-24 (Although the Carafano decision utilized the terms interactive service pro-
vider (ISP) and interactive computer service (ICS) interchangeably, the distinction, for purposes of
§ 230 immunity, presented no semantic difference. Matchmaker.com was a website, and therefore
constituted both an ISP and an ICS).
115 See also, Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting § 230 immu-
nity for an ICS operator who took affirmative steps to edit, review, and determine whether to publish
the alleged defamatory content on the ICS website and listserv).
116 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
117 Id. at 1161.
118 Id. at 1162.
119 Id. at 1165.
120 Id. at 1166.
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/6
2021] Note 63
“provides immunity only if the interactive computer service [(ICS)] does
not ‘creat[e] or develop[ ]’” the information ‘in whole or in part.’”121
The gravamen of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommates.com
concerned its definition of development, such that an ICS develops third
party content “if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the
conduct.”122 The Roommates.com decision received significant attention,
with one legal scholar branding it “the most significant deviation from
the Zeran line of cases”123 and another predicting that the decision would
embolden plaintiffs to capitalize on the opinion’s numerous ambiguities
and produce inconsistent court decisions.124 As a result, the once clear
test from Zeran for distinguishing between an ICS and an ICP became
obscured with other courts following suit in proscribing application of
§ 230 immunity.125
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit issued another opinion in the wake of
Roommates.com denying § 230 immunity to a website. In Barnes v. Ya-
hoo!, Inc., Barnes brought suit against Yahoo for promising to remove a
defamatory posting about the plaintiff and failing to do so.126 Barnes’
former boyfriend created false profiles containing nude photographs and
open solicitations to engage in sexual intercourse.127 The former boy-
friend used the fake profiles to impersonate Barnes in online chatrooms
and provided Barnes’ contact information and physical addresses, which
resulted in Barnes receiving emails, phone calls, and personal visits with
the expectation of sex.128 Barnes contacted Yahoo requesting removal of
the false profiles over the course of several months.129 During this pe-
riod, a Yahoo executive verbally confirmed that the profiles would be
taken down; however, this did not occur until Barnes filed a lawsuit
against Yahoo.130
121 Id. at 1166 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
122 Id. at 1167-68.
123 Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The Ninth Circuit
(Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching Web-
sites, 38 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 329, 377 (2008).
124 Eric Goldman, Roommates.com Denied230 Immunity by Ninth Circuit En Banc (With My
Comments), TECH. & MKTG. L. Blog (Apr. 3, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/
roommatescom_de_1.htm.
125 See Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that § 230 did not
immunize a dating service from civil suit by an adult plaintiff who was arrested after having sexual
relations with a fourteen-year-old met on the site when the minor claimed to be eighteen); see FTC
v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that § 230 did not immunize defendant
website where it converted legally protected records from confidential material to publicly exposed
information and therefore “developed” content because it facilitated the transaction).
126 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
127 Id. at 1098.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1099.
130 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit addressed the application of § 230 immunity by
evaluating the statutory language of the provision.131 By coalescing sub-
sections 230(e)(3) and 230(c)(1), the Ninth Circuit determined that § 230
only immunizes against liability when:  “(1) a provider or user of an
interactive computer service [(ICS)] (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat,
under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of infor-
mation provided by another information content provider [(ICP)].”132
This three-pronged test would later be recognized as the Barnes Test.
The Ninth Circuit held that § 230 immunized Yahoo against Barnes’
negligent removal claim, but not her promissory estoppel claim.133 The
negligent removal claim was found unpersuasive because “removing
content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of
such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher
of content it failed to remove[,]” which is exactly what § 230 is intended
to prevent.134 In contrast, the promissory estoppel claim arose from Ya-
hoo’s unfulfilled promise, and therefore, § 230 did not apply.135 Judge
O’Scannlain reasoned that “[c]ontract liability here would come not from
Yahoo!’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo!’s manifest intention to be
legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of mate-
rial from publication.”136
The Barnes decision affirmed that: (1) “neither this subsection nor
any other declares general immunity from liability deriving from third-
party content” because “to provid[e] immunity every time a website uses
data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the CDA],”137
and (2) § 230 immunity does not apply if the claims do not relate to the
publication of user-generated content.138
131 Id. at 1100.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1107.
134 Id. at 1103.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1100 (quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1100).
138 Id. at 1109 (quoting Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights, 519 F.3d at 669) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that § 230 did not immunize a website from a negligent failure to warn claim where plain-
tiff had a ‘special relationship’ with the website and alleged the website had actual knowledge that
some of its users were engaged in a rape scheme, plaintiff  was raped as result of the scheme, and the
website failed to warn plaintiff and other users); HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918
F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that § 230 did not immunize defendant website from complying
with a local short term rental ordinance requiring transactions occurring on defendant’s website to
involve only licensed properties).
16
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IV. DYROFF: THE CORRECT LEGAL OUTCOME AND A BROADENING
OF § 230 IMMUNITY
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY FINDS ULTIMATE SOFTWARE NOT
LIABLE
It would be easy to blame the Ninth Circuit’s § 230 jurisprudence
and its broad application of immunity for providing Ultimate Software a
free pass to walk away from the drug-related tragedy in Dyroff, but this
would be the incorrect analysis. The Dyroff decision is an efficient distil-
lation of existing case law and application of the Barnes Test.139 Much of
the rationale in Dyroff comes from the Ninth Circuit’s prior decisions in
Carafano and Roommates.com. Ultimate Software neither created nor
developed its own content, and even if it had, it could have retained im-
munity so long as it was not the specific content at issue.140 Similar to
Carafano, the illegal content of Greer’s post did not come from Ultimate
Software, but from Greer himself, and the content of the reply post came
from Castro, his drug dealer.141 And unlike in Roommates.com, Ultimate
Software did not require Greer to create illegal content as condition of
using Experience Project.142 In addition, Ultimate Software’s push notifi-
cation and group recommendation algorithms did not develop or materi-
ally contribute to the illegal content in Greer’s posts.143  In contrast to
Roommates.com, Ultimate Software’s algorithmic manipulation of user
generated content only facilitated communication and the content of its
users. The purpose of the website functions was to accomplish a specific
task or action, much like a cog in a machine, and therefore cannot consti-
tute content created or developed by Ultimate Software.
Although Dyroff aimed at pleading around § 230, there was no legal
support for her arguments that Ultimate Software colluded with drug
dealers and owed Greer a duty of care. Unlike J.S. v. Village Voice Me-
dia Holdings, LLC, Ultimate Software did not have a specific section for
illegal activity that required its own particular posting requirements.144
139 See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-01 (“(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker
(3) of information provided by another information content provider”).
140 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124.
141 Dyroff, 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *3.
142 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166.
143 See id. at 1175; see also Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269 n.4 (The material contribution test
makes a “crucial distinction between, on the one hand, taking actions (traditional to publishers) that
are necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable content and, on the other hand, responsi-
bility for what makes the displayed content illegal or actionable”).
144 See J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95 (2015) (en banc) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged website operators helped develop illegal content by requiring
17
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While the Ninth Circuit highlights Ultimate Software’s anonymity
polices and advocacy of Internet privacy,145 these are not the strongest
reasons to dismiss the collusion argument. Anonymity and privacy are
policies equally shared by social media giants like Facebook and dark
web markets like Silk Road.146 A better reason, which the decision points
out, is Ultimate Software’s burden of law enforcement information re-
quests, which does not plausibly support collusion with drug dealers.147
Equally, Dyroff’s duty of care and failure to warn theories of liability
could only have found solid ground if Greer had a special relationship
with Ultimate Software, and there was actual knowledge of illegal activ-
ity.148 This was not the case for Greer. No special relationship existed
between Ultimate Software and Greer because of the anonymity and pri-
vacy policies employed, and no facts supported that Ultimate Software
had actual knowledge of illegal activity.149 Further, the website’s push
notifications and recommendation algorithms did not make Greer worse
off than any other user of the website because these functions were ap-
plied to all users.150 This reasoning is consistent with Carafano, where
§ 230 immunity is not lost because the opportunity for creation of illegal
and legal content are equally available.151
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly applied its § 230 jurisprudence
in finding Ultimate Software immune from liability, it did not adequately
define the scope of term content neutral, resulting in a holding that im-
plicitly immunizes any manipulation of third-party content facilitating
communication or user content that does not materially contribute to the
illegality of content.
B. THE SHIELD BROADENS FOR MANIPULATION OF THIRD-PARTY
CONTENT
The term content-neutral applies where specific website functions
or tools may give rise to unlawful content but do not result in develop-
users to disclose information into its “escort” section that encouraged sexual exploitation of children
and therefore were not immune from liability under § 230).
145 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1099-100.
146 See generally Aditi Kumar and Eric Rosenbach, The Truth about the Dark Web, 53 FIN. &
DEV. 22 (2019), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/09/pdf/the-truth-about-the-dark-
web-kumar.pdf.
147 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1099-100.
148 See Doe, 824 F.3d 846 (holding that § 230 did not immunize a website from a negligent
failure to warn claim where plaintiff had a ‘special relationship’ with the website and alleged the
website had actual knowledge that some of its users were engaged in a rape scheme, plaintiff  was
raped as result of the scheme, and the website failed to warn plaintiff and other users).
149 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1100.
150 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101.
151 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123-24.
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ment of content for purposes of § 230 immunity, so long as there is no
material contribution by an ICS to the content at issue.152 For example,
an ICS that provides the means of searching within user data, sending
email notifications to users, and making grammatical revisions of user
posts, retains § 230 immunity so long as those content-neutral tools do
not materially contribute to the illegality of the content.153 However, the
Dyroff decision leaves open the door for varied interpretation of a con-
tent neutral test by failing to define its scope, particularly in the context
of algorithmic manipulation of user data. Other courts have been more
explicit in finding algorithmic manipulation of user data content-neutral
if the ICS handled legal and illegal content identically.154 Instead, the
Dyroff decision simply lumps algorithmic manipulation of user content
into the Roommates.com exception where no liability occurs without ma-
terial contribution. While Dyroff is a convenient and legally tenable deci-
sion, it is not particularly helpful for future courts tasked with applying
§ 230 immunity to algorithmic manipulation of user content.
Additionally, the Dyroff decision uses the terms content neutral
tools, content-neutral functions, and content-neutral fashion in similar
capacities and without distinguishing among them.155 Whether a content-
neutral tool, function, and fashion are one in the same is not clear and
exacerbates the uncertainty in the context of algorithmic manipulation of
user content. Moreover, the court utilized the content-neutral language
that supported the § 230 defense to rationalize its rejection of Dyroff’s
duty of care claim.156 The result of conflating the duty of care claim with
the undefined content-neutral terminology is an implicit preclusion of
any duty of care workaround to § 230, so long as an ICS remains con-
tent-neutral.157
In summary, the Ninth Circuit reached a legally tenable conclusion,
but employed semantically problematic terms without adequately defin-
ing their meaning or scope. As a consequence, Dyroff opens the door to
152 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169.
153 Id. (An ICS that provides the means of searching within user data and sending email
notifications to users and that makes grammatical revisions of user posts retains § 230 immunity so
long as the ICS does not materially contribute to the alleged illegality).
154 See Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1271 (2019).
155 See Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1096-1100 (“Ultimate Software, as the operator of Experience
Project, is immune from liability under the CDA because its functions, including recommendations
and notifications, were content-neutral tools used to facilitate communications . . . Ultimate
Software owed Greer no duty of care because Experience Project’s features amounted to content-
neutral functions that did not create a risk of harm. . . No website could function if a duty of care
was created when a website facilitates communication, in a content-neutral fashion, of its users’
content”) (emphasis added).
156 Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101 (“No website could function if a duty of care was created when a
website facilitates communication, in a content-neutral fashion, of its users’ content”).
157 See supra note 147, at 66.
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varied interpretations in future decisions, implicitly forecloses an avenue
of recourse against ICSs where a duty of care may have existed, and
collectively and perhaps unintentionally broadens § 230’s immunity
protections.
CONCLUSION
The Dyroff decision is a reminder of the broad scope of § 230 im-
munity. The Ninth Circuit arrived at the correct legal conclusion, but
failed to provide an explanation or examples of what does and what does
not constitute a content neutral tool. The Dyroff decision obscures what
is neutral for purposes of § 230 immunity, and fosters greater opportu-
nity for ICSs to fall under § 230’s shield where any non-material al-
gorithmic manipulation of user data enabling user-to-user
communication is content neutral, regardless of any associated illegality.
Nevertheless, the CDA remains viable and relevant today as a safe-
guard for First Amendment speech on the Internet. However, current In-
ternet development is staggeringly more sophisticated than when the
CDA and § 230 were enacted in 1996. Modern Internet companies em-
ploy thousands of humans and artificial intelligence-based methods to
moderate offensive and illegal content.158 The once broad shield de-
signed to foster growth and development of the nascent Internet has be-
come antiquated and requires updating to reflect modern realities. Until
Congress revisits the CDA and § 230, decisions like Dyroff, although
legally correct, are likely to engender varied decisions when undefined
terminology is used that unnecessarily broadens application of § 230 im-
munity. The Internet is no longer a child of the ’90s needing congres-
sional helicopter-parenting.  It is time for the Internet to be more
accountable to its users and work towards preventing tragedies like
Dyroff by using its existing moderation tools to identify and to prevent
facilitating illegal conduct.
158 See Social media’s struggle with self-censorship, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.economist.com/briefing/2020/10/22/social-medias-struggle-with-self-censorship.
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